Why Public Opinion of the Criminal Justice System is Important by Wood, Jane L.
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Wood, Jane L.  (2009) Why Public Opinion of the Criminal Justice System is Important.    In:
 Public Opinion and Criminal Justice.   Willan, pp. 33-48. ISBN 978-1-84392-401-2.
DOI











Jane L Wood 




Why Public Opinion Is Important 
 
Allusions to public opinion and its influence in a democratic society are 
common. Media assumptions of what the public wants in a whole host of areas 
permeate our daily reading. But the question that few seem to give any consideration 
to is why public opinion is important? The answer lies at the heart of our democratic 
structure: we elect officials to represent us and as such, we expect them to bear our 
opinions in mind as they structure policies that guide the way we live. Of course there 
will be areas that the public take less interest in and areas that interest the public 
more. The purpose of this chapter is to outline the influence that public opinion seems 
to have on some of the key areas in the justice system. It also examines the effects of 
ignoring public opinion, whether public opinion has a justified place in the formation 
of political policies and does public opiniRQDGHTXDWHO\VXPPDULVHSHRSOH¶VWKRXJKWV
on criminal justice issues. 
In a democracy the public has a central function in the administration of justice 
and it is crucial to the criminal justice system that the public fulfils this function, 
otherwise specific parts of the justice system would be unable to operate. For 
instance, the reporting of crime, providing evidence to the police and attending court 
as jury members or as witnesses all stem from public cooperation with the justice 
system. Since the public has this vital role in the administration of justice any lack of 
confidence they may have in the system could undermine or seriously disrupt the 
justice process. Consequently, to prevent the public from losing faith in the system it 
is necessary that there is at least some congruence between public opinion and 
criminal justice arrangements and procedures (Morgan, 2002). 
Few could argue that the public do not hold opinions about the criminal justice 
system. Indeed, public opinion on criminal justice issues seems to be subject to almost 
LQFHVVDQWµWHPSHUDWXUHWDNLQJ¶E\YDULRXVIDFWLRQVRIWKHPHGLDUHVHDUFKHUVDQG
government officials all of whom are intent on pinning down our views on broad and 
specific criminal justice issues. $V*UHHQQRWHV³«SXblic opinion should be 
the ultimate EDVLVRIWKHODZ´S DQG³7KHFLWL]HQ¶VYRLFHLQWKHUXQQLQJRIWKH
country, and confidence that it will be heard, are what give governments and the state 
WKHLUOHJLWLPDF\DQGDXWKRULW\´)DXONQHUS,f the criminal justice system 
has moral credibility then the people it governs will respect it and abide by its laws 
(Robinson and Darley, 1998). If people become dissatisfied with the criminal justice 
system they may refuse to comply with its laws and resort to vigilante justice 
(Flanagan, McGarrell and Brown, 1985). 
The centrality of public opinion in governance is apparent by the way public 
opinion penetrates policies. Public opinion regarding a political policy sets the 
µboundaries of political permission¶ (Yankelovich, 1991). That is, the limits or 
borders within which the public will support or tolerate a policy. In the U.S.A. public 
opinion has apparently driven a multitude of domestic policies such as term limits, tax 
FXWVDQGDSDWLHQW¶V%LOORI5LJKts (Doble, 2002). In the U.S.A. justice system public 
opinion instigated ODZVVXFKDV0HJDQ¶VODZµWKUHHVWULNHV¶ODZVWKH%UDG\%LOODQG
the assault weapon ban (Doble, 2002). In the U.K. the Labour Government has placed 
DQHPSKDVLVRQµHYLGHQFH-EDVHG¶policy formation and uses focus groups, the 
3HRSOH¶V3DQHOFLWL]HQV¶MXULHVDQGRSLQLRQVXUYH\V to gauge public opinion before 
forming new policies. As a result, in both the U.K. and U.S.A. significant policy 
changes have been attributed to the influence of public opinion. Public opinion also 
seems to have influenced the more operational side of the criminal justice system 
The importance of public opinion in constructing criminal justice policies 
Policing  
,QWKH8.WKHUHH[LVWVDQLGHDORIµSROLFLQJE\FRQVHQW¶&DUWHU7KLV
holds that the police can only achieve their goals if they have the support and 
cooperation of the public. However, the relationship between the police and the public 
is more reciprocal than the above statement suggests. The police service provides 
services to the public that they cannot obtain elsewhere and so the quality of policing 
is critical to a public that relies on its efficiency (Lipsey, 1980). It also follows that the 
public¶V opinion of the service that stands at the interface of society and the criminal 
justice system, will be strong and potentially influential.  
In the U.S.A. the police service needs the support of taxpayers in order to be 
JUDQWHGEXGJHWUHTXHVWV7KHSXEOLF¶VFRQILGHQFHLQWKHSROLFHLVFRQVLGHUHGthe 
cornerstone for public cooperation and the basis for police legitimacy (Rosenbaum et 
al, 2005). A communications/public relations sector of the police service was created 
following the public outcry against police tactics used to manage urban and civil 
ULJKWVSURWHVWVGXULQJWKH¶V0RWVFKDOOand &DR'XULQJWKH¶VWKH
Los Angeles riots following the death of Rodney King led the then Police Chief 
Willian Liquori to state,  
³([WHQVLYHPHGLDDQGFLWL]HQDWWHQWLRQWRUHFHQWHYHQWVLQWKH
country has shone a spotlight on all of us. We must protect our 
cities, our departments and our employees against the erosion of 
FLWL]HQFRQILGHQFHDQGQHJDWLYHSXEOLFLW\´S 
Since then the public relations side of policing has expanded and increasing numbers 
of civilian personnel with journalism/communications backgrounds have been 
employed as SXEOLFLQIRUPDWLRQRIILFHUV3,2V7KH3,2¶VMRELVWRLQIRUPPHPEHUV
of the media and the public on the progress/advent of agency operations, events and 
activities. PIOs also assess public opinion which is then used to inform the formation 
of internal police policies.  
Although police services in the U.K. are not budget-dependent on the public in 
the same way as they are in the U.S.A., public perceptions of police performance play 
an important role in police functioning. Between 2000-2003 public confidence in the 
police deteriorated (e.g. Hough, 2003) despite a fall in crime rates (Simmons, 2002). 
This lack of confidence was attributed to the public¶V fear of crime (Thorpe and 
Wood, 2004). Public perceptions of the U.K. as a high-crime society conflicted with 
statistics which suggested a decrease in crime and FUHDWHGDµUHDVVXUDQFHJDS¶
between actual crime levels and public opinion. The Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO) called for reassurance strategies to change this culture of fear of 
crime (ACPO, 2001) and reassurance was embedded in subsequent policies regarding 
police services (e.g. the Police Reform Act, 2002, The National Policing Plan, 2002, 
the National Reassurance Policing Programme, 2003). The 2004 White Paper, 
µBuilding Communities, Beating Crime¶ outlined measures intended to create a closer 
bond between the police and the public to provide the public with the reassurance they 
needed (and, of course to HQKDQFHWKHSXEOLF¶VRSLQLRQRIWKHSROLFHVHUYLFHIn the 
White Paper the public are considered as consumers of police services and factors one 
might associate with consumerism thread throughout the document. For instance, 
customer services were to be included in all police forces; police performance would 
be assessed DFFRUGLQJWRWKHSXEOLF¶Vpriorities and views about police services; and 
local communities would be given the right to trigger action by relevant agencies to 
deal with acute or persistent problems of crime and anti-social behaviour.  
That the Government should reform the police service on the basis of the 
SXEOLF¶Vfear of crime rather than actual crime levels seems to show that governing 
bodies do attend to public opinion ± even if that opinion is formed according to 
perceptions and not hard facts. The rationale for acting on the public¶V perception of 
crime is provided LQWKHµ2SHQ$OO+RXUV¶UHSRUW3RYH\ZKLFKPDLQWDLQs that 
if the public feels reassured they will have more confidence in the police, be more 
likely to provide intelligence, act as witnesses and engage with courts. In turn, this 
would lead to a reduction in crime and thus reassure the public even more. While this 
is intuitively sensible, some warn that despite its apparent good intentions, 
reassurance policing, with its focus on public concerns may run into conflict with 
Home Office targets for policing (Herrington and Millie, 2006). In such cases 
governmental priorities for policing end up being given more priority than the overall 
goal of improving neighbourhood security. In this way, despite its worthy aims 
reassurance policing runs the risk of being VHHQPRUHDV³«DSXEOLFUHODWLRQV
exercise than a way to significantly contribute to the fight against crimHDQGGLVRUGHU´
(Herrington and Millie, 2006, p. 156). As a result, it seems that public opinion may be 
influential in policing but only up to the point where it conflicts with government 
objectives. 
Sentencing and sentencing policy 
³,QWKHRU\VHQWHQFLQJdecisions are influenced only by 
officially approved considerations, whether embodied in 
stature, practice direction case law or circular. In real life 
most sentencers admit to having some regard to what they 
EHOLHYHWREHSXEOLFRSLQLRQ´:DONHUS. 64).  
The report of the Sentencing Review in England and Wales (Home Office, 
2001) acknowledges that the confidence of the public needs to be considered when 
sentencing offenders. Also in 2001, the Government commissioned two reports on the 
penal system both of which addressed the issue of public confidence in the criminal 
justice system. The Halliday report (Home Office, 2001) concluded that if people are 
expected to uphold the law and not take it into their own hands then they must feel 
confident that justice is being achieved in sentencing. Halliday (2001) sees public 
confidence, together with a reduction in offending, as an important aim in sentencing. 
In other words, Halliday sees public opinion as something that should be taken into 
consideration in sentencing practice. However, for Halliday, consideration of public 
opinion in sentencing is desirable but not essential and he cautions against sentencers 
EHLQJ«³GULYHQ EHIRUHWKHZLQG´RIDSSDUHQWSXEOLFPRRGUHJDUGOHVVRIWKH
principles that need to JRYHUQVHQWHQFLQJ´SLL$OWKRXJK+DOOLGD\¶VUHSRUWpresents 
sound reasons why public opinion is important in sentencing it also acknowledges that 
the public is badly under-informed about sentencing practices because they tend to 
underestimate the severity of sentences and believe that sentences are more lenient 
than they actually are. To address this lack of knowledge Halliday proposed that more 
systematic efforts were needed to explain sentencing practices to the public.  
In the second report, Auld (2001), like Halliday, acknowledges the importance 
of public confidence in the criminal justice system but unlike Halliday who proposed 
that public opinion should be considered in sentencing, Auld recommends that it 
should be ignored on the basis that public opinion is not knowledgeable or consistent 
enough to warrant a role in sentencing. Like Halliday Auld maintains that the public 
VKRXOGEHEHWWHULQIRUPHGEXWRQO\RIWKHLURZQLJQRUDQFHVLQFHKHVWDWHVWKDW³«LI
public ignorance stands in the way of public confidence, take steps adequately to 
GHPRQVWUDWHWRWKHSXEOLFWKDWLWLVVR´S 
Even though the public seems to be under- or ill-informed it seems that public 
opinion still manages to influence sentencing. Evidence from Australia suggests that 
public opinion believes that community protection is paramount and this has led to 
community protection being embedded in various sentencing acts and laws (Tomaino, 
1997). The Australian Government maintained it was attuned to the heartfelt concerns 
of public opinion and this gave it a mandate to get tough on crime (Fox, 1987). In 
Canada it has been suggested that judges impose more punitive sentences if they 
believe that this is what the public wants (Ouimet and Coyle, 1991). Although 
sentencers, just like Halliday (2001) and Auld (2001) are aware that public opinion is 
often formed with little knowledge and may be based on misperceptions, they 
continue to take public opinion into account. As Walker, (1985) observes, 
 ³«IHZVHQWHQFHUVUHJDUGWKHSXEOLFDs competent to 
dictate the choice of sentence; but a substantial number of 
sentencers and policy-makes regard it as important that 
sentencers VKRXOGQRWVWUDLQSXEOLFWROHUDQFH´S-73). 
So, for example, if sentencers think that public tolerance would be strained by a 
sentence at the lower end of the sentencing tariff they may be inclined to hand down a 
harsher sentence. If, however, the sentencer believes that public tolerance is not an 
issue then s/he may be inclined to hand down a sentence at the lower end of the tariff.  
 In the U.K. both Labour and Conservative governments have favoured 
mandatory sentences of imprisonment for those offences that seem to evoke strong 
feelings among members of the public (Faulkner, 2006). The murder of two year old 
James Bulger in 1993 by ten year olds Robert Thompson and Jon Venables resulted in 
the two boys being treated by the media (both tabloid and broadsheet) with the 
³«NLQGRIRXWEUHDNRIPRUDOFRQGHPQDWLRQWKDWLVXVXDOO\UHVHUYHGIRUWKHHQHP\LQ
WLPHVRIZDU´King, 1995, p. 172). Public outrage was so strong that the vehicle 
transporting Venables and Thompson to court was attacked as people called for the 
offenders to be imprisoned for the rest of their lives, or worse (Fionda, 1998, p.86). In 
the midst of the PHGLD¶V demonisation of children DQGWKHSXEOLF¶VDSSDUHQWview that 
children needed tougher measures to keep them under control, the Conservative 
Government introduced Secure Training Orders for children aged 12 ± 14 leading to a 
rise in the incarcerated population of young offenders by 30% between 1993 -1997. 
2WKHUPHDVXUHVLQWURGXFHGWRDVVXDJHWKHµPRUDOSDQLF¶DVVRFLDWHGZLWKFKLOG
offenders included zero tolerance, boot camps, curfews, electronic monitoring, 
mandatory minimum sentences, the naming and shaming of young offenders, an 
increase in the sentencing powers of the Youth Court and an erosion of the right to 
silence (Mugnai, 2001).The ZKLWHSDSHU³1R0RUH([FXVHV´VSHOWRXWKRZWKH
new Labour Government intended to hold children accountable for their actions and 
in 1998 Doli Incapax was abolished. Doli Incapax, was the presumption that children 
aged 10 ± 13 could not be held criminally responsible unless the prosecution showed 
that the defendant(s) fully understood that their behaviour was wrong (as happened in 
the Bulger case). The abolition of Doli Incapax meant that children from the age of 10 
were deemed to fully understand the difference between right and wrong unless the 
defence could show that they did not i.e. the child had severe learning difficulties etc. 
In 2001 the Criminal Justice and Police Bill added to this backlash against young 
offenders when it gave courts the power to remand children who repeatedly 
committed medium level offences (e.g. assault, theft and criminal damage) to secure 
accommodation. 
 These policies and law amendments imply that public outrage/concerns are 
influential in shaping political mandates. The idea that public opinion has been the 
cornerstone for the criminal justice policies noted above is supported by statistics that 
show that there had been little or no increase in criminal activity by young people for 
the ten years preceding the introduction of the harsher tougher penalties (Ahmed, no 
date). If there was little change in youth crime it remains that the increase in punitive 
policies was probably due to the influence of public opinion coupled with an effort by 
politicians to appear to be tough on crime to avoid being perceived by the public as 
weak and voted out of power (Ahmed, no date). That politicians are intent on currying 
public opinion is evidenced by the fact that they will support public opinion even if it 
is inaccurate. For example, statistics at the time of the James Bulger case showed a 
decrease in crime rates yet, in an effort to µplay to the SXEOLFJDOOHU\¶7RQ\%ODLUWKH
then Shadow Home Secretary, (1993) stated in the popular press that if people 
believed crime was rising, then, regardless of official statistics, it was rising (See 
Green, 2006).  
Ignoring public opinion: political consequences 
 Although the above seems to spell out the political sensitivity to public 
opinion and the facilitating role that public opinion can play in policy formation, there 
are exceptions. As noted above, in a democracy the government functions within the 
µERXQGDULHVRISROLWLFDOSHUPLVVLRQ¶<DQNHORYLFK,IDJRYHUQPHQWIRUPV
policies outside these boundaries of permission it may see the public renounce the 
SROLF\'REOHDQGUXQLQWRµFRQIURQWDWLRQSROLWLFV¶0RUDQ5DGLFDO
policy changes that are introduced without building public support also run the risk of 
provoking such µFRQIURQWDWLRQSROLWLFV¶EHWZHHQSXEOLFDQGJRYHUQPHQW 
In 1991 the Conservative government formulated the poll tax in a space of 
three months (Moran, 2001). When the proposed changes were sent out for public 
consultation the warnings of imminent disaster were ignored by the government who 
appeared to dismiss the importance of compromise with public opinion (McConnell, 
2000). The result of the government ignoring public opinion led to DµFOLPDWHRI
REMHFWLRQ¶ and the largest campaign of civil disobedience in the U.K. in the 20th 
century (Cowley, 1995). As public dissent increased, the U.K. witnessed some of the 
worst riots since the Second World War and this combination of political protest, 
together with SHRSOH¶VSHUFHSWLRQVRIXQIDLUQHVVDQGthe substantial increases in 
DYHUDJHWD[UDWHVXQGHUPLQHGSHRSOH¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRSD\WKHWD[1RQ-payment rose 
to well above 50% in some areas, which, in concert with acts of civil disobedience, 
resulted in government promises to abandon the tax (Besley, Preston and Ridge, 
1997). The poll tax protests are also thought to have been so influential that they 
became an important if not the main, reason why Margaret Thatcher was forced to 
resign as Prime Minister (e.g. Cowley, 1995). Understandably, those who stood for 
leadership of the Conservative Party following her departure all promised to abolish 
the tax (Besley, Preston and Ridge, 1997). 
That WKHSXEOLF¶VREMHFWLRQVWRWKHSROOWDx succeeded in changing policy 
where other expressions of public opinion such as the anti-Iraq war protests did not is 
odd. One explanation could be the number and type of counteractive measures 
available for the public to take against government policy. For instance, during the 
poll tax protests people of all ages resisted the tax by refusing to pay it. The 
subsequent imprisonment of elderly erstwhile law abiding members of the public for 
non payment of the tax may have stimulated public opinion further and prompted 
even more resistance, i.e. more people refusing to pay. In other protests, such as the 
Iraq war demonstrations, although the number of people who took to the streets was 
high (in excess of half a million), other courses of action, such as financial withdrawal 
were not feasible weapons of persuasion. Here it seems, that although public opinion 
is deemed WREHLPSRUWDQWDQGDVRQHSROLWLFLDQSXWLW³7KLVFRXQWU\LVUXOHGE\
FRQVHQWDQGZHIRUJHWWKDWDWRXUSHULO´&RZOH\SLISeople have only 
one course of action i.e. protestation open to them, politicians may not always pay 
attention to public opinion. If, on the other hand, people have additional options for 
protesting (e.g. refusing payment) that can be used to impede a policy¶V successful 
implementation, then the influence of public opinion on policy may be more 
profound.  
Another compelling feature of confrontation politics seems to be which 
members of the public express an opinion. Socially and economically dominant 
groups have the power to affect the criminal justice system in their own interests 
while socially and economically marginalised groups are more likely to be adversely 
affected by the system (e.g. Liska, 1987). So, we may expect that when the middle 
classes protest, more attention will be paid to their views. Also, pensioners who 
express their objections WRWKHLUPHPEHUVRISDUOLDPHQW03¶Vmay make more of 
an impression because they are pensioners (Cowley, 1995). During the poll tax 
protests a lot of pensioners attended their M.P. surgeries to state their objections to, 
and difficulties with, the tax. That pensioners would protest in this way seemed to 
impact on 03¶VOHDGLQJWKHPWRPDNHFRPPHQWVVXFKDV ³:KDWZDVZRUU\LQJZHUH
the amount of old and vulnerable people coming along with their bills who palpably 
FRXOGQ¶WDIIRUGWKHP7KDWZDVUHDOO\GLVWUHVVLQJ´&RZOH\SMoreover, 
many members of the public who protested about the poll tax often did so armed with 
political/financial arguments that explained why they objected to the tax. An informed 
public offering sound arguments as to why the tax was unfair, together with the 
impact of street-based protests, instigated the abolition of the poll tax (Cowley, 1995). 
This suggests that although public opinion is important in policy formation/change, 
which members of the public protest, how they do so and why they object are 
important factors that possibly determine whether public opinion has any impact on 
the formation/amendment of government policies.  
One of the problems inherent in examining the role of public opinion in policy 
formation is identifying a causal relationship. In an instance such as the poll tax 
protests the influence of public opinion on policy change seems to be reasonably 
clear. However, such instances are rare. It is generally assumed that policies are 
formed in response to public preferences because the threat of electoral sanction 
hangs over governments (Hobolt and Klemmemsen, 2005) and a large body of 
research examining democratic politics does indicate a general congruence between 
public opinion and policy behaviour (e.g. Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson, 1995; 
Franklin and Wlezien, 1997). However, some authors contend that public opinion is 
not formed independent of political influence but results from a politically 
manipulative process (e.g. Brooks, 1990). Such opinions are, nonetheless in a 
minority: the majority of authors maintain that public opinion forms first and 
government policy is formed to be congruent with public views. Nevertheless, even if 
public opinion is a consequence of an autonomous decision making process and does 
influence policies it is very difficult to establish this empirically. A correspondence 
between public opinion and government policy may equally result from: public 
opinion influencing policy; policy influencing public opinion; a reciprocal process 
between public opinion and policy; or even some unidentified factor that influences 
both policy and opinion that leads to a spurious relationship between the two (Hobolt 
and Klemmemsen, 2005). As yet, no empirical methodology has been completely 
successful in addressing these problems. Consequently definitive documentation of 
the influence of public opinion on policy remains elusive.  
Is listening to public opinion justified?  
Since, as noted earlier in this chapter, the public are generally under ± or ill ± 
informed about the functioning of the criminal justice system is the government 
justified in taking public opinion into account when forming policies? Some argue 
that politicians are quite justified in ignoring public opinion since politicians cannot 
be expected to take public opinion into account if the public pays little attention to 
what politicians do (Franklin and Wlezien, 1997). However, crime is capable of 
generating public passion in a way that is unheard of in other areas (Warr, 1995) and 
the public pays more attention to policy areas that are salient and important to them. 
This heightened attention is then used to form opinions that shape party support and 
voting behaviour ( e.g. Abramovitz, 1994). When an issue is salient and important 
people are also more likely to pay closer attention to the related actions of politicians 
and the media will respond by concentrating reports on areas that reflect this level of 
interest (Brody, 1991). However, media reports rarely disclose all the relevant facts 
(Green, 1996). For example, when forming opinions regarding appropriate sentencing 
the public needs to know the facts of a case as it was presented in court and not as 
WKH\ZHUHSUHVHQWHGODWHULQWHOHYLVLRQUHSRUWVRULQWHUYLHZV*UHHQ*UHHQ¶V
argument is that WKHSXEOLF¶VRSLQLRQLVDYLWDOFRPSRQHQWRIFULPLQDOMXVWLFHSROLF\
but the public needs to develop an opinion based on all the facts of a case and not just 
the snippets that are summarised at a later date. Rarely are all the facts disclosed or 
indeed, reported accurately and all too often WKHFDVHVWKDWDUHEURXJKWWRWKHSXEOLF¶V
attention are atypical, which is why they are deemed worthy of reporting (Green, 
1996). As Green (1996) observes,  
³««WKHFRQFOXVLRQVDERXWVHQWHQFLQJUHDFKHGE\WKHDYHUDJH
member of the public are drawn from inaccurate or inadequate 
reports of a small and unrepresentative sample of sentencing 
FDVHV´S116).  
Observations such as these fuel arguments such as that proposed by Auld 
(2001, see above) who maintains that the level of public ignorance rightly gives 
judges and politicians a free hand to make policies that they consider fair and 
efficient. In addition to public ignorance it needs to be considered that public opinion, 
whether developed from an informed or ill-informed perspective is apt to change. 
This means that if governments take public opinion into account, policies could be 
formed according to erratic trends. For example, the doctrine of less eligibility 
dictates that during times of high unemployment, members of the public expect 
prison conditions to be more austere than the conditions endured by the poorest 
members of society, whereas in times of economic prosperity the public tends to be 
more sympathetic towards offenders (Sparks, 2000). So, if governments form policies 
DFFRUGLQJWRDYDFLOODWLQJSXEOLF¶VRSLQLRQthey run the risk of appearing to be 
indecisive, which in turn, may undermine public confidence that the country has an 
effective leadership. If however, public opinion was to be set aside and policies were 
to be formed by politicians and judges alone, then the government would avoid being 
seen as ineffective. Nevertheless, elected politicians also run the risk of being voted 
out if they appear to ignore the opinion of their constituents (Green, 2006). 
Some authors argue that even if the public is not closely conversant with the 
facts of many public policy arrangements this does not give justice officials carte 
blanche to form policies or make policy changes which are likely to affect most 
people (Morgan, 2002). Yankelovich (1991) points out that experts are small in 
number and although they may not deliberately mislead the public, they exclude 
public contribution by using inaccessible jargon and tend to dismiss the views of 
ordinary people who do not command their level of expert knowledge. As such, 
Yankelovich (1991) maintains that these experts effectively impose their personal 
values on other people bHFDXVHWKH\³««IDLOWRGLVWLQJXLVKWKHLURZQYDOXH
MXGJHPHQWVIURPWKHLUWHFKQLFDOH[SHUWLVH´S,IWKHVHH[SHUWVJRWRRIDUDQG
FRPPDQGHHUWKHSXEOLF¶VUROHLQJRYHUQDQFHWKHQZHZLOOKDYH³«7KHIRUPDO
trappings of democracy without the substanceDQGHYHU\RQHZLOOVXIIHU´S2Q
the other hand, we cannot afford for the public to dominate governance because this 
will result in demagoguery (Yankelovich, 1991).  
Yankelovich (1991) insists that what we need is a balance of power and 
influence where public and experts co±exist in sympathy and support of one another. 
However, cXUUHQWO\JRYHUQPHQWVDOOWRRIUHTXHQWO\UHO\RQµWRSRIWKHKHDG¶RSLQLRQ
polls to gauge public opinion. As Green (2006) notes, politicians tend to make use of 
³LQDGHTXDWHDVVHVVPHQWVRISXEOLFRSLQLRQIRUSROLWLFDOHQGV«´DQG³«UHVSRQGWR
the filtered public sentiments offered by the media ± the most commanding substitute 
for the real thing available´S141). The government effectively fails to 
acknowledge the limits of public knowledge and fails to introduce strategies that will 
help improve public knowledge (Roberts and Hough, 2002). This can be achieved but 
it needs to be fostered in a culture where the public is encouraged to contribute to its 
own governance and where experts do not resist this happening (Yankelovich, 1991). 
Yankelovich (1991) considers the issue of public opinion to be even deeper 
WKDQWKHPHUHJOHDQLQJRIµWRSRIWKHKHDG¶WKRXJKWVJDrnered in opinion polls. 
Yankelovich makes the distinction between public opinion and public judgement. 
Public judgement is a specific form of public opinion that shows people have given 
an issue more thought, have weighed±up the alternatives, and have taken a wide 
variety of factors into account than the opinions measured by opinion polls.  
Green (2006) advocates that using deliberative polls (DPs) governments 
would obtain more considered public views based on public judgement rather than 
SXEOLFRSLQLRQ'3VZHUHLQWURGXFHGLQWKH8.GXULQJWKH¶VWKH\LQYROYHG
interviews and questionnaire administration to members of the public on any relevant 
issue e.g. crime and punishment, a period of deliberation and subsequent interviews 
some time later (see Hough and Park, 2002). Green (2006) argues that DPs should 
become part of the consultation process that inform White Paper development. 
Indeed, the efforts by the current Labour Government to employ focus groups etc (see 
above) to inform policy seems to support this view. DPs would be expensive but not 
as expensive as policy u-turns often are (Green, 2006). DPs could be conducted as 
part of the annual British Crime Survey and whenever a serious issue such as juvenile 
crime (such as followed the Bulger case) arises. Although Green (2006) 
acknowledges that some of the points regarding the implementation of DPs are 
SRVVLEO\LGHDOLVWLF'3VDOVRKDYHDGHPRFUDWLFXWLOLW\VLQFH³«WKHLPSRUWDQFHRI
public consultation and of building public confidence is recognized by many as self 
HYLGHQW´(Green, 2006, p 150) and the value of conducting DPs lies in their ability to 
provide politicians with more accurate and more considered public opinions. These 
they can then use or discard when formulating policies, but at least they will know 
them to be an accurate assessment of public opinion and not ill informed, ill 
conceived, top of the head opinions. 
Conclusions  
Public opinion undoubtedly has some role to play in the development of 
criminal justice policies. What we cannot know for certain is the magnitude of that 
role. Certainly successive governments seem to have taken public opinion at least into 
consideration when forming justice policies relating to policing and sentencing. The 
exact relationship between policy formation and public opinion remains a matter for 
speculation as to whether public opinion informs policy or policy informs opinion. 
What we do know is if a policy transcends the boundaries of political permission 
public opinion can result in swift retribution that undermines the policy and even calls 
the legitimacy of a government into question. Yet, the notion that the public is ill-
informed permeates public opinion debates and provides some with the ammunition 
to argue that public opinion should be dismissed in favour of expert opinions. 
However, to replace public opinion with expert opinions alone would potentially 
undermine our democracy and invite public wrath. It seems that public opinion and 
public consultation are increasingly important features of policy formation. 
Consequently, whether we use deliberative polls or some other derivative to assess 
public opinion, it is clear that governments, even if they disregard those opinions, 
should be presented with SHRSOH¶Vconsidered views and not some off-the-cuff 
opinion formed with little thought. Public opinion lies at the heart of a democratic 
culture and as such its role is crucial in permitting and censuring the actions that 
governments take on our behalf. 
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